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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Should you be interested in this book?
Science is commonly perceived to be the last word in logic and objectivity, where the latter has 
two aspects to it – one of being person-independent and the other of being a true description of 
the workings of Nature. In this little book of mine I will tell you, as best as I can, of the possible 
presence of extra-logical components in the reasoning process of individuals and groups of 
individuals, making special reference to the context of scientific inquiry. And I’ll also indicate 
the possibility of a skewed fit between what science tells us about nature, and Nature itself. In the
process, we will get to understand how all this can constitute a strength rather than a deficiency 
in the way science inquires into nature.
To what extent do people conform to standards of logic and rationality in everyday reasoning 
and in scientific activity? How do the extra-logical components woven into the reasoning process
of individuals lend colour to the way they solve problems relating to workings of nature? To 
what extent does inter-personal and group interactions succeed in effacing the subjective 
component involved in individual and collective reasoning and yield objective knowledge, 
transformed from the belief-laden knowledge of individuals and groups to knowledge gained by 
humankind?
These and related questions have repeatedly been addressed by authors for a long while now. I 
will collect here a few of the basic ideas that have come up in the course of studies into these 
important and interesting issues. In the process, I hope to tell you, in outline, how and to what 
extent scientific inquiry can possibly be conditioned by the mind-set of people.
In recent decades, philosophy has taken a  naturalistic  turn. Briefly stated, naturalism looks at things
and  processes  as  they  actually  are,  without  looking  at  these  from  too  abstract  and  analytical  a
perspective – a tendency so common in philosophy. In this, the naturalist point of view follows the
point  of  view of  science  itself  (see,  for  background,  [Gonzalez1];  [Giere],  chapter  1).  The  issues
relating to mechanisms underlying the inferential processes in men, and to human rationality at large,
are now being addressed from a naturalist point of view. The branch of enquiry dealing with these and
many other related questions on mechanisms of human thinking that has developed over the last fifty
years or so is known as  cognitive science.  In this book, I will have occasion to refer to the naturalist
point of view and to ideas in cognitive science, as someone who has been keenly interested in these in
the context of philosophy of science, someone with a background in physics. 
My job in this book will be to share with my readers a point of view that has a good degree of contact
with current literature on a broad area in cognitive science and philosophy of science. I will explain a
number of basic concepts to set the tone of this book and then go on to propose a framework that raises
deep questions on the received view of science, based on cognitive aspects of our reasoning process. In
the process, I will venture to place before you my own interpretation and speculation of how things
work in individual inferential processes that find expression in scientific exploration by individuals and
by scientific communities at large, again taking care that these do not conflict with the body of opinions
and beliefs shared by experts in the relevant areas of discourse.
I will do my best to build up a picture that hangs together, is not inconsistent with what experts have
found and written on the issues involved, and is, one hopes, relevant and interesting.
Here are a few words on how the text is displayed in this book.
As you can see, this book runs in two courses – one written in larger font that constitutes the main text,
and the other  in smaller  font  that  makes up a  sub-text.  The latter  is  for  the purpose of  additional
explanation and clarification, along with references to literature.  There will not be too many of the
references, and most of those will be to books and monographs. You will find only few references to
journal articles, since I do not want to burden the presentation with technicalities. You can read the text
and the sub-text any way you like.
This said, let us move ahead. I will, in the remainder of this opening chapter, take you to a brief tour of
some of the key ideas that will define the content of this book.
INFERENCE  AND  REASONING:   THE  INTRINSIC  AND  THE  EXTRINSIC
The first basic idea I wish to highlight is that of the role of inductive inference in reasoning in 
general, and in scientific inquiry in particular. Induction and deduction are commonly taken to be
two distinct modes of reasoning where, in either of the two, one starts from one or more 
premises and then draws a conclusion. This act of starting from a set of premises and reaching at 
some conclusion I will call inference. In this act of inference, a person may, depending on 
circumstances, make some use of rules that may have something to do with logic. Now, this may 
seem to be a pretty roundabout and tentative way of putting things but, in this book, you will 
soon get used to such roundabout statements, and qualifications (with or without the use of 
parentheses), because most of the time we will be treading on murky ground. 
Going back to inference and the use of rules, we will say that the act of inference conforms to the
description of reasoning whenever some set of rules of general validity are involved, applied 
sequentially. Now, the concept of rules is a tricky one since there are two distinct contexts in 
which one can talk of rules – a distinction that, at times, goes unnoticed. As a person gets into an 
act of inference, she may be following, in her own way, a set of rules of her own where, to make 
matters complicated (and interesting too!), many of the rules may be unknown even to herself 
because they operate unconsciously. These we will call intrinsic rules for the sake of easy 
reference. On the other hand, somebody, say, a cognitive psychologist, looking at her inferential 
act may try to fathom out what she (the subject) is doing, by trying to relate the relevant premises
and the conclusion by means of a set of extrinsic rules, rules called in use by her, the 
psychologist. How are these two sets of rules related?
In a sense, this is a fundamental question not only in the area of enquiry we are looking at, but in all areas
of human enquiry, being central to the concept of science itself. I, like many others, have always found it
fascinating. This is a theme we will time and again come back to. As I see it, it is a basic question raised
by naturalism. Think of the following scenario: a sequence of numbers is being taken out from a machine
– never mind how or by whom – and the numbers are being displayed to you. You are trying to fathom
out the ‘rule’ underlying the sequence in which the numbers appear. You make a guess and find that the
guess is working – only up to a point. As more numbers come out, you make a fresh guess and are again
rewarded, but once again you find that the sequence is more inscrutable than what your guess tells you.
The rules you are guessing at and comparing with the sequence at any point of time are the extrinsic ones,
which don’t quite match with the ‘rules’, if any, by which the sequence is made up – the intrinsic ones.
For all we know, the sequence may be of a random nature, with a number of regularities built into it that
make you arrive at guesses and let you be hopeful of eventually arriving at the ‘correct’ intrinsic rues.
Nevertheless,  the intrinsic and the extrinsic remain inexorably distinct.  The business of science is no
different. Here, it is Nature that causes a multiple sequence of events for mankind to guess at the rules
underlying the occurrence of the events. Naturalism firmly distinguishes between the guesses and the
actual workings of nature, and does not entertain  abstract notions of whether and how the former may
approach the latter.     
Cognitive science tries to guess at the intrinsic rules, if any, involved in the inferential reasoning 
process of individuals by comparing it with a set of extrinsic rules, and the starting point in this 
endeavour is provided by what may be called the rules of logic. Here the term ‘logic’ really 
refers to deductive logic, because people also make frequent use of the term inductive logic, 
thereby referring to a distinct type of inferential activity. It makes more sense, however, to speak 
of inductive inference rather than of inductive logic, and to use the terms ‘deductive logic’ and 
‘logic’ interchangeably. 
At a deeper level, the concept of ‘intrinsic rules’ of nature (or, in a different context, of intrinsic rules
operating in inferential processes), taken literally, is somewhat a misplaced one. What we think of as a set
of intrinsic rules may be just a set of interrelations, or  correlations, among things in nature (or among
cognitive factors in the process of making of inferences). Science aims at understanding or ‘reproducing’
(in its models of the world or of the human mind) these correlations, but in its own interpretational terms;
what is ‘intrinsic’ to the world or to a cognitive mind, is sought to be replicated ‘externally’, by means of
‘laws’  and  ‘rules’.  Inherent  to  the  idea  of  laws  and  rules  is  the  supposition  of  some  design  (not
necessarily, though, by some superhuman ‘mind’). The correlations in nature, or among cognitive factors
in the human mind, need not be based on any ultimate design that is there for us to decipher.
In more precise terms, one has to distinguish between various classes of logic like, for instance, 
propositional logic, predicate logic, doxastic logic, and deontic logic or, more generally, 
instances of modal logic, some of which may partially overlap with one another in connotation. 
However, all of these are of the nature of deductive logic since they relate to ways of inference 
involving the operation of unequivocally defined rules of inference on premises whose meanings 
in some bigger context are not of direct relevance. As for now, all we need to know is that 
deduction and induction are two types of inferential activity that can, at least provisionally, be 
distinguished from each other. In this scheme of things, reasoning can be described as an 
inferential activity that has some correlation with rule-based inference, where the rules, generally
speaking, are not specific to individuals, and have some degree of universality such as the rules 
of deductive logic. As you see, there is no sharp distinction between reasoning and inference, 
which is only to be expected of the issues in human cognition we will be discussing in this book.
The various instances of modal logic are designed to capture different aspects of thought and reasoning,
as they operate in real life, but from the logical and computational point of view. These find applications
in a wide variety of disciplines and are,  in particular,  of vital  relevance in  artificial  intelligence. An
overview of modal logic can be found in [Benthem]  
Indeed, as we will see, the distinction between deductive and inductive inferences is also not so 
sharp. Once again, if this sounds confusing, you better get used to it because cognitive 
psychology and some other parts of cognitive science are way apart from physics or chemistry, 
and require a different mindset. Be warned that our job here is, primarily, to get exposed to a 
number of ideas rather than to try to define those too precisely and too prematurely. In this, we 
will be following the spirit of a critique to the conventional image of science itself, an image that
is increasingly being brought into question in recent decades. 
Aspects of the conventional image of science, one that has lingered in philosophical and logical accounts
of science, as also in popular perception, have been collectively termed the ‘legend’ by Philip Kitcher
([Kitcher1], chapter 1).  Kitcher is a notable name in contemporary philosophy of science in his broad,
perceptive, and nuanced approach to issues in science, including those relating to social aspects of science
in today’s world.   
In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce a few other terms that will come up repeatedly in
this book (as these do in our everyday discourse as well) in connection with human mental 
activity, namely, perception, thinking, and cognition, of which, the last term is a bit more 
specialized compared to the other two. And again, I will be no more specific than telling you that
I will use these terms in the sense of common usage. 
PERCEPTION  AND  COGNITION
We perceive something when a set of stimuli act to influence our senses (typically, the sense 
organs) so as to create an impression of the source(s) where the stimuli originate from. 
Frequently, perception involves an internal processing of information whereby our mind comes 
to form an idea of that source of information (such as, the appearance of an external object in the 
case of visual perception) conforming, in some sense, to the nature of the source itself (thus, we 
perceive a table as a table, though there exists serious debate, not all vacuous, as to how much 
our perceived table is the same thing as the table itself). 
There has been protracted debate as to whether our senses give us an unblemished picture of the world.
Each and every act  of  perception is,  in a  very basic sense,  an act  of  interpretation in terms of  past
experience. “No one now seriously believes that the mind is a clean slate upon which the senses inscribe
their record of the world around us: that we take delivery of the evidence of the senses as we take delivery
of the post”, writes Peter Medawar, a pioneer in the field of immunology and in the science of tissue
transplantation, and philosopher of science of great clarity of view [Medawar]. Medawar goes on to quote
Nietzsche: "Everything  that  reaches  consciousness  is  utterly  and  completely  adjusted,  simplified,
schematized,  interpreted,....",  and  Kant  as  well:  "experience  is  itself  a  species  of  knowledge  which
involves understanding,...". 
Here is one more instance of how perception involves complex psychological processing of information
received from the world: “Perceptual processes were at one time believed to be lower-level functioning,
both because they are accomplished without our conscious control and because even animals can do such
things as recognize patterns ....... and learn spatial layouts.... . Perceptual processes were contrasted with
the higher mental processes, such as problem solving, logical thinking, and decision making, which are
accomplished consciously, and are much less obvious in animals. There is, however, a basic problem with
labeling perceptual processes as lower-level: The ability to recognize patterns and direct our attention
involves very elaborate cognitive computations, which are heavily influenced by top-down processes that
depend on one’s knowledge and interpretation of situations. Thus, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
separate lower and higher forms of cognition” ([Weisberg], p181).
The idea that all our perception of nature is, fundamentally, an interpretation, will constitute a recurring
theme in this book.     
Incidentally,  we often use the term ‘perception’ in a deeper and broader sense (my perception of the
current political situation differs from yours). This variation in senses attached to the same term is very
common when we try to say something of our mental world, since the mind is an infinitely complex and
flexible whole, where it is almost impossible (but often necessary!) to meaningfully distinguish between
parts of it or between mental processes of various descriptions.  
When we say that perception involves some processing of information, we are close to the sense 
carried by the term cognition, because cognition is commonly understood to be that mental 
activity where there takes place some processing of thoughts and ideas, tied to some purpose. 
What is important and interesting in this context is that some (or most) of the processing may be 
of an unconscious nature, which we ourselves may not be aware of. Cognition, in other words, 
refers to a broad class of mental activity that includes inference making and reasoning in which, 
generally speaking, there is a conscious component. In this, inference making and reasoning are 
special types of cognitive activity where there is a relatively greater role of a ‘purpose’ or a 
‘goal’ guiding the course of the cognitive activity though, again, the purpose or goal may be, to a
large extent, hidden from our own conscious awareness.
While perception and cognition are broader in scope than inference making and reasoning, 
thinking is, again, a broad and all-inclusive term with unconscious and conscious processes 
involved in it. Of, course, like everything else, the term ‘thinking’ is used in senses often widely 
differing from one another (what were you doing?, - oh, just thinking; or, I am thinking hard how
best to entertain our guests); but, well, what can one do? 
CONCEPT:  THE BASIC  ENTITY  OF  THOUGHT
One other term will be especially relevant for our purpose in this book: concept. What is a 
concept? As I see it, a concept is some kind of organized thought about some object or set of 
objects (or about some other concept(s)) that tells us something about the object and that is made
use of in any context involving that object. For instance, my concept of a table is involved when 
I ask somebody to move our dining table to some other place in the room (the concept tells me 
that the table is something that can be moved, by the application of some particular kind of 
effort, without getting altered in any appreciable way) or when I am engaged in a philosophical 
debate, claiming that the table is not entirely what it seems to be (the concept tells me that there 
are aspects to the table not perceived by me). The term concept holds a huge significance since it
is by means of concepts that we understand and organize the world around us and, what is more, 
act in (and upon) it. Concept, in brief, is the thought entity by means of which we make sense of 
our world and of our life. A concept commonly involves a central entity (the table) associated 
with numerous other entities stored in the mind, all these woven into a single whole. Concepts, in
turn, are associated with one another at various levels so as to make up more complex structures 
like ideas, beliefs, and items of knowledge. I emphasize the term association here: association 
between thought elements in the formation of concepts, and association between concepts in the 
formation of more complex forms of thought. 
In summary, I have introduced to you the terms ‘reasoning’ and ‘inference’, ‘deductive’ and 
‘inductive’ types of inference, and ‘logic’. I have also mentioned terms that will hover in the 
background throughout the discourse presented in this book – ‘thinking’ (or ‘thought’), 
‘cognition’, and ‘perception’. And I have told you what the term ‘concept’ will be meant to stand
for. This will constitute the starting point to the next phase of our journey where we will dwell 
upon these ideas at greater length, and upon many other related concepts and ideas.
THE  SUBSTRATUM  OF  COGNITION
 Let me go back to the point where I digressed from, namely, inductive inference. While the 
basic idea of inductive inference will be one constituent of the central theme that will define this 
book, the other constituent ideas of dominating relevance will relate to the substratum of mental 
activities that determine and guide the process of inductive inference – activities that belong to a 
substratum in the sense that these have traditionally been ignored in the understanding and 
analysis of human cognition, and also in the sense that it involves a multitude of mental 
processes that the individual (or the group of individuals) engaged in making the inference is 
often not aware of. I refer to the substratum of the cognitive unconscious.
This idea of a substratum is of relevance in every sphere and at every level  of human enquiry.  It  is
relevant, in the sense indicated above, in the context of the way we perceive the process of cognition.
More generally, it is relevant in the way science inquires about nature. Any such enquiry is, by the very
nature of things, limited to some specific domain or other, and there is a substratum that is either ignored
as  being  not  of  relevance  or  whose  existence  is  not  known or  suspected.  But,  unknown to  us,  the
substratum holds the key to many things. For instance, in the domain of electricity and magnetism, the
substratum, at one stage of discourse (before the introduction of unifying ideas by Faraday and Maxwell),
was constituted by the wave nature of electrical and magnetic disturbances, which held the key to a vast
range of phenomena involving the joint variation of electrical and magnetic field strengths. Again, within
the context of the classical electromagnetic theory, the substratum relates to the quantum nature of the
electrical  and magnetic fields. This is another theme that will be repeatedly encountered in this book:
every  enquiry  is  limited  to  some  specific  context or  other  that  may  or  may  not  be  explicitly
acknowledged, underneath which lurks a substratum – one that is either not known to us or about which
we are not aware. The entire perspective of the enquiry changes as the substratum is recognized and taken
into account, whereby a new context is set.
LOGICAL LEAPS IN INFERENCE
Continuing with the question of inductive inference, I will, in this book, devote quite a few 
words to induction and deduction, broadly distinguishing between the two (I will outline to you 
the sense in which these two are distinct and also the one in which they overlap), emphasizing 
time and again that inductive inference is a process involving logical leaps, i.e., gaps in the 
sequential application of rules of a more or less general validity – ones of well-defined nature. 
This is an all-important and pervasive feature of human thinking that begins at the level of the 
most trivial mental activity of the child and of the grown-up (and, of course, the trivial is only 
seemingly so) and ending at the level of the most intricate scientific reasoning of the individual 
and the scientific community. The logical gaps entail, inevitably, the necessary role of choice 
between alternatives, where a choice is a selection that is not dictated by rules independent of the
specific context in which the choice is made. This will again require that we address the question 
as to what the choice really and precisely is and how it is actually exercised, and will again make
us confront the question of conscious and unconscious factors in determining the course of 
human inferential activity. Incidentally, whenever we exercise a choice, we actually make a 
decision. The exercise of choice and the making of decisions, these are ubiquitous at all levels of 
human activity though we are not always aware of these. The surgeon makes a choice and saves 
the patient’s life; or, the general exercises a choice and makes a strategic retreat – it is only such 
momentous events that engage our attention. But, unknown to us, choices and decisions continue
to be made incessantly, and this is what makes our very existence possible.
WHAT SCIENCE AIMS AT
Science is done by the individual scientist on the one hand, and by the scientific community on 
the other. I will not try to define who the individual scientist is, or what differentiates her from 
her fellow men. And the scientific community will remain similarly undefined, like so many 
other things in this book, because explicit definition does not always add to understanding. 
In quite a considerable number of issues addressed in this book, I will rely on what I think is the common
ground between me and you, and will not try too hard to make things ‘evident’ – all I want to do is to
share, and not to impart. Sharing begins on common ground and ends up expanding it.
The scientific thinking of the individual is generated and processed in the labyrinthine innards of 
the human mind and, as such, is conditioned by and stamped with individual idiosyncrasies. At 
the same time, the initiation of the thought process and the final product of it have to relate, at 
least in some sense, to what the scientific community thinks and does. It is the community that 
ultimately decides whether and when the intellectual product offered by the individual scientist 
gets to be integrated into mankind’s storehouse of knowledge. Here we will have to confront the 
question as to how far the socialization of individual thought leads to an objective view of nature,
as it is commonly supposed to.  
And this will open up another vital issue: what is science for? Is science a means to solve, and to 
keep on solving, problems faced by men and groups of men as they move along in the business 
of their life, a means to continually ensure and improve upon their survival and existence? In 
short, is science a means and a strategy to solve problems faced by men and women in this 
world? Problems relating to disease, hunger, and the innumerable other aspects of living? Or, is 
science a strategy to probe into the workings of nature, into the hidden secrets and mysteries that 
make nature what it is? How much of a practical necessity is science and how much of an 
aspiration to Truth? Can it be that the two are so intimately related that it is futile to seek an 
answer to this question either way? Or, can it be that by recognizing the distinctive natures of 
these two aspects to science we can achieve clarity in addressing and answering some other 
questions of concern to us? I don’t really know, but we will see ..... .   
Whatever be the purpose that the individual or the scientific community may want fulfilled by 
doing and practising science, the effort to do science involves immensely complex motivations, 
aspirations, tensions, and intellectual resources. Some of these are within the individual, and 
some within the community, but the two merge unto each other in unfathomable ways. In this 
book, my attention will be focused once onto the individual and once onto the community, but 
always with the implied admission that the individual is a microcosm of the community and the 
community carries all the contrariness of the individual. Science begins in the mind of the 
individual and ends up in the knowledge, belief, and practice of the community. And again, it 
begins in the concerns of the community, and ends up blossoming in the mind of the individual.
By the term ‘community’ I will  primarily mean the scientific community within which the individual
scientist works; at times it will implicitly stand for smaller groups of workers in the immediate periphery
of the working scientist with whom she collaborates and shares her thoughts; and at others it will mean the
social environment at large that nourishes and nurtures her and, at the same time, makes her a part of a
complex process. 
THE  LOGICAL  AND  THE EXTRA-LOGICAL:  INFERENCES  AND  BELIEFS
And now I feel I have set the tone of this book: Within the broader question of what we want 
science to do for us – how much we do science with a view to understanding the mysteries of 
nature and how much to acting upon nature to achieve certain ends – this book will take up the 
question of how science is done by the individual situated within a broader context – the context 
provided by the scientific community on the one hand, and by the broader social and cultural 
environment on the other. In the pursuit of both these questions, we will examine the role that 
logic plays in the scientific activity of the individual and the scientific community, and in 
shaping our concept of nature, and we will look at the nature and extent of extra-logical aspects 
in the inferential processes involved in everyday activity and in science. These extra-logical 
aspects relate to the logical leaps and the choices that are forced upon us in facing and 
confronting the world around us, in confronting Nature if you wish, where both conscious and 
unconscious factors contribute to the process of taking a leap and making a choice. 
In  this  book,  I  will  adopt  the  view  that  doing  science  is  continuous  with  our  everyday,  mundane
inferential activity, while being an exceptionally special and focused instance of the latter.
In this, the two recurrent themes that will be thrust upon your attention will be: inductive 
inference, and belief. Belief is commonly, and quite justifiably, held to be the harbinger of 
superstition, pseudo-science, and bigotry. At the same time, belief is also commonly held to be 
the antithesis of logical inquiry. But here I will try to present a different perception of the role of 
belief. 
BELIEF- EMOTION- FEELING:  THE  UNACKNOWLEDGED  TRINITY 
Belief is that vast marshy ground that supports both superstition and bigotry on the one hand, and
the most astounding inferential feat on the other. And it is exquisitely difficult to disentangle 
these two aspects of belief from each other. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that there has not
been much relevant work specifically on belief in cognitive psychology, while not an 
inconsiderable part also relates to the nature of belief itself. Belief is not knowledge, but it 
provides that substratum on which knowledge rests and unto which knowledge merges 
continuously, quite seamlessley, and with little differentiating shade. In inductive inference, 
belief provides the springboard for logical leaps, the compass needle that, rightly or wrongly, lets
us select, choose, and decide among alternatives for which pure logic supplies no clue. And in 
this, belief is aided and abetted by emotion and feeling. Belief, emotion, and feeling, these make 
up the triumvirate, operating mostly in the unconscious world of men, that I believe to have a 
great but subtle role in guiding and shaping their scientific quest, a quest commonly perceived to 
be the pinnacle of conscious, logical inquiry on the part of humankind. In this book I will tell you
if there is ground for this belief of mine.
THE   RECEIVED  VIEW  –  AND  BEYOND
Indeed, this book will, in its own way, pose a critique to the commonly held image or, in other 
words, the ‘received view’, of science. As I have stated above, recent decades have witnessed a 
questioning, from various different quarters, of the traditional image of science and, as a matter 
of course, of science itself – of what science has been doing to our world. I will draw from some 
of these other critiques. I will, in particular, look into the question of how objective a view of 
nature science provides us with and examine how fragile that view is. This, along with a number 
of other similarly important issues, will constitute an implied re-examination of the commonly 
held perception of science, if not of science itself.
The origin of the ‘received view’ is diffuse, since this view resulted from diverse accounts of science and
the scientific method given by scientists and philosophers, and other men of eminence, mostly belonging
to the western intellectual tradition. Roger Bacon and Francis bacon are considered as initiators in the
building up of the perception of what should count as the method of science. The British empiricists
contributed greatly to the further consolidation of the view, to which a logical foundation was added by
the logical positivists and logical empiricists of the last century. Many of these trends within the broad
umbrella of the received view were, of course, remarkably acute and prolific, and were sharp enough to
lay the foundation of a critical examination of the received view itself. Karl Popper, while an outspoken
critic of logical positivism, was among the last great architects of the received view, and attempted the
formulation of a sharp criterion for the  demarcation between what is  scientific and what is  not.  The
demarcation  problem subsequently  lost  its  initial  promise  of  providing  a  precise  definition  of  what
science is supposed to be. Ironically, the Marxist trend in social movements contributed to the perception
of science as a disembodied intellectual process, realizing the immutable laws of dialectics. It added to the
received view the tenet of social determination (but not social construction) of the course of science that
eventually turned out to be a simplistic and suffocating point of view while, at the same time, retaining
the potential to pose a substantial critique to science in the present day world. 
The counter-current to the received view began with a naturalistic turn to the philosophy of science whose
origins were, however, yet more diffuse. Results of the naturalist turn in the philosophy of science were
augmented by trends in cognitive psychology that emerged as the behaviourist approach in psychology
lost momentum. Naturalism, moreover, is itself not a sharply defined point of view, and various naturalist
trends are often devoid of a common and strong family resemblance. Michael Polanyi was among the
early critics of the logical positivist and logical empiricist view of science as the repository of impersonal,
logical,  and  objective  knowledge,  progressing  cumulatively  to  a  true  picture  of  nature  and  its  inner
mechanisms.  N.  R.  Hanson,  the  “Flying  Professor”,  raised  doubts  against  the idea  of  an  ‘objective’
confirmation of scientific theories by observed data, pointing out that observation itself was theory-laden
and, drawing upon the pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, contributed in no small measure
to the inauguration of the cognitive-naturalist era. And then came the final onslaught by ideas unleashed
by Thomas Kuhn ([Kuhn1]), aided quite considerably by a criticism of the received view of science by
Paul Feyerabend [Feyerabend]. 
Philip Kitcher [Kitcher1] has drawn a distinction between ‘legend bashers’ and ‘science bashers’. Among
the former are those critics of the received view of science who aim at transcending the limiting horizon
of the received view and arriving at some position beyond that horizon. Kitcher is himself a critic who,
nevertheless, aspires to identify a ‘legacy’ to the legend that has been built around the received view. 
Science bashers, on the other hand, will not be referred to in this book beyond making the remark that
science bashing is the necessary obverse of science fetishism which completely ignores deep questions
relating to the idea, seemingly ingrained in science, of taking control over Nature. Science, indeed, is in
trouble in today’s world since it has become, to all intents and purpose, synonymous with  control  and
power. 
These few remarks are, of course, too sweeping to be taken seriously. I include these as being indicative
of the spirit in which this book would like to view the commonly held perception of science. Precisely
because of the sweeping and personal nature of the appraisal presented in these remarks, I do not include
a great many references to substantiate what I say. However, I consider  [Kitcher1]  and  [Kitcher2]  as
general references that you may find useful, and illuminating too. 
The themes raised in this chapter will run through the course of this book.
I will move on from here.
CHAPTER 2 
OBJECTIVITY
How  truthful  is  science?
Or
Does  science  REALLY  describe  the  workings  of  Nature? 
This chapter will be concerned, principally, with scientific realism.
 
I will examine, to the best of my understanding, how objective our conception of Nature, gained 
through Science, is. Now, the term ‘objective’ may have different connotations in different 
contexts. One possible connotation is: person-independence. We would prefer the findings of 
science to be independent of the idiosyncrasies and the mind-sets of individuals, as also of those, 
if any, of specific communities and cultures. In short, we would prefer science to be a product of 
the whole of mankind. At this point, I will not question as to how far this ideal aspiration is 
achievable, either in practice or in principle. I will provisionally assume that, somehow, science 
appears as a product of mankind without any birthmark resulting from its origins in individuals 
and particular scientific communities. In that case, the second connotation of the word 
‘objective’ will demand attention and examination: how accurately does Science tell us what 
Nature actually is, and what its inner workings are?  
The question of impersonality of science will be addressed in subsequent chapters (mostly in chapters 3,
5, and 6), where we will get to face the contrariness inherent in the process of science: science purports to
be knowledge possessed by mankind, but it develops in the minds of individuals – minds deeply riddled
with beliefs of a personal nature alongside of ones less personal and more objective.
This, in brief, is the question that scientific realism addresses.
There exists quite a vast literature on scientific realism and critical appraisals of scientific 
realism from various different points of view. This is a subject of hard core philosophy which it 
is way beyond me even to think of outlining or summarizing, let alone attempting an in-depth 
review on. Scientific realism as a point of view, or as a philosophical position, has had its 
beginnings in antiquity, and continues till date to spawn heavily polemical literature of various 
shades at a rate that shows no signs of abetting. The polemics proliferates into ever-expanding 
areas, in pace with scientific theories themselves.
My aim in this chapter is, as a matter of fact, quite modest, one which neither the realist nor the 
antirealist will, perhaps, consider worthy of objection in any strong measure. In the end, 
however, I will likely be judged closer to the realist position, and the antirealist may not be 
happy. The realist also may not feel comfortable in my company, but I will not worry too much 
on questions of who thinks what, and will now get down to what I want to say to you on how and
to what extent science describes nature and explains its workings.
Recall that I want this book  to make you aware, if you are already not so, that the conception of nature
that science builds up, is rather riddled with logical  gaps or, in other words, science is not as logical a
business as it is commonly made out to be, being in the nature of an interpretation of the world. It is the
existence of the irreducible gap between the interpretation and that which is interpreted, that, on the face
of it, speaks against realism. At the same time, this book does not want to give you the impression that
science is not much more than a convenient and clever  exercise,  with little engagement  with reality,
where it is incapable of making authentic statements about nature, which is where it will differ from the
antirealist point of view as well: if science constitutes an interpretation of the world, then the world has
necessarily to be supposed to exist independently of the interpretation.
THE  IRREDUCIBLE  GAP
The very first thing that, I think, is needed, is to stick to the basic fact that our conception of 
nature, as built up in scientific theories, is distinct from nature itself. I will not adopt the position
of stating that it is meaningless to talk of ‘nature itself’, which is the stance sometimes adopted in
critiques of realism where one underlines the fact that the most that we can say in the matter is to
the effect that we have innumerable ‘sense data’- various sensations on the basis of which we 
build up all our concepts and theories. 
When we press our palm against a table-top, we feel some specific sensation which, when we 
come to think of it, is all that we have in this particular instance of our conception of a table. To 
be sure, we can also see the table standing in front of us, but there again, all we can be ‘certain’ 
of is our sensation of vision. Even summing up all our sensations about the table, we can never 
be sure of the existence of the table itself. 
How, for instance, can we rule out the possibility of an omnipotent malicious demon creating in 
us the illusion of all these sensations of a table, which is how Descartes argued his case for 
radical scepticism? (Likewise, Descartes argued, you cannot rule out being in a state of perpetual
dream.) This is the position of idealism that Bishop Berkeley espoused. It may seem to be a 
strange position to adopt for a mind as remarkably penetrating as Berkeley’s. Berkeley’s 
arguments were indeed of great cogency, so much so that if one cares to follow those arguments 
closely, one will be left with little option but to reach the position to which he leads ([Ladyman], 
chapter 5).
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is acknowledged as one of the founders of modern western philosophy. His
approach  was  a  foundationalist  one  in  that  he  looked for  irreducible  foundations  of  knowledge.  He
adopted an attitude of fundamental scepticism towards things empirical and accepted the workings of the
mind (that part of it of which we are aware) as the one facet of reality we can be certain of, being the
fountainhead of rationality. The other facet of reality the mind works on is a God-given one, distinct from
the reality our senses tend to lead us to. In this, Descartes’  position was antithetical  to the one later
adopted by the empiricists who accepted the empirical as the ultimate authentic source of knowledge, and
were sceptical towards the authenticity of what the mind infers. 
George Berkeley (1685-1753) accepted the reality of the sense impressions but did not accept these as
being caused indubitably by an independently existing world. Reality, in other words, consisted only of
sense impressions or ideas, and the mind that perceives those ideas. Our conception of an independently
existing real world is possibly some kind of a trick that the ideas play on us.
This is one instance of a general problem that we will encounter again and again in our 
discourse. It is indeed not possible to come up with a purely logical argument taking us from our 
sensations to the world ‘out there’, since there does exist an irreducible gap between the two.  
The realist’s argument that our sensations must be sensations of something, and that that 
something is simply the world out there, may appear to be quite ‘natural’, but that still does not 
make it incontrovertible from the point of view of logic, because one may conjure up alternative, 
though apparently weird, explanations of our sensations like the one invoking the malicious 
demon (or a modernized version of it, namely, the so-called ‘brain-in-the-vat’; there exist entire 
semi-religious philosophies saying that the world is nothing but one great illusion). Arguments 
between realists and people going by these theories of mind-dependent reality – a reality that is a
construct of the mind making use of the sense impressions – can be endless as also pointless 
since the worlds of the two protagonists never meet. 
The ‘brain-in-a-vat’ (see, for instance, [Poundstone]) is a certain type of  thought experiment supporting
the  position of  universal  scepticism (akin  to  Cartesian  doubt)  towards  an  empirically  sensed  reality.
Assuming that all our sensations and ideas originate in patterns of neuronal excitation in our brains, it is
not necessary to enquire further as to where those excitations come from. A disembodied brain, with its
neurons excited in various appropriate patterns can be made to produce exactly the series of sensations
that an individual goes through in her life. Once again, there is no sure-shot way of countering such an
argument because it is meant to be impervious to any such attempt.
The world, indeed, transcends our senses and our concepts (or, to put it differently, our concepts 
transcend the world), and to reach from the latter to the former is a fundamental and irreducible 
act of induction that the realist cannot deny, and the more sensibly he comes to terms with this 
basic fact the wiser he will prove himself to be. It is precisely the gap between nature-in-itself 
and our conception of nature that implies the possibility of alternative routes in the explanation 
of our sense data, such as the evil demon, the brain in the vat, or even the world as a big dream 
or illusion. 
The  ‘irreducible  gap’  between  Nature  and  our  conception  of  it  is,  however,  only  a  matter  of  our
perception as cognitive agents. More of this later.
It is all very well to accept the realist explanation, of the existence of a real and structured world 
causing our sense impressions, as ‘natural’, and to dismiss these other explanations as ‘weird’ 
and contrived, but quite another to use pure logic alone in the act of dismissal because, in the 
end, all these labels like ‘natural’ or ‘weird’ are extra-logical qualifications that we impose on 
concepts and theories. Later in this book we will have occasion to look into the matter of the 
relevance of such qualifications in making inferences in our daily life and in doing science (the 
general theory of relativity is a BEAUTIFUL one; the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory
looks WEIRD to me; he has the knack of coming up with SIMPLE and ELEGANT ideas). All we have to 
take note of now is that these qualifications do not necessarily make an explanation either 
compelling or worthless from the point of view of pure logic. The way we interpret the relation 
between our sensations and the world around us is a choice that we have to make – one that 
cannot be done sitting back and looking at formulas in logic. All our life we have to go on 
applying our mind, look at possible alternatives, and risk making choices – the responsibility for 
the making of those choices lies with us, and us alone. The choice of accepting the position that 
all our senses are caused by an independent and structured reality (the senses are also part of that 
reality) is a huge act of induction that every child goes through without ever being aware of it. 
And, as she grows up, she renews her commitment to the choice, this time consciously, and 
continues to get along with it unless, of course, she gets weary of accepting the responsibility of 
making choices and decisions in a real, uncertain, and troubled world, and swaps position so as 
to believe now that the world is one big illusion.  
THE  OBSERVABLE  AND  THE  UNOBSERVABLE
Of course, the acceptance of a real world independent of our minds is not the end but rather just 
the beginning of scientific realism. While scientific realism has got to say much more than this, it
is not, however, one single, neatly defined package. Protagonists differ from one another in what 
they accept as the defining description of scientific realism. However, pretty much everybody 
committed to realism has to address the question of a supposed distinction between ‘observable’ 
and ‘unobservable’ entities making up the world. The table in front of me is one instance of an 
observable entity while the electron, of whose existence we become aware only indirectly, by 
certain effects created by it, such as by a voltage pulse in an ionization chamber, is an 
unobservable entity. There is a philosophical position that tells us that the claims made in 
scientific theories about the unobservable entities are only convenient means of describing and 
systematizing various observations, and the entities themselves cannot be assumed to ‘exist’ in 
any real sense.
Most realists, however, agree that the electron is as ‘real’ as the table in the dining room, though 
the means of registering the existence of the two differ from one another. I will stick by my 
earlier disclaimer that I will not enter into a detailed analysis of all the various philosophical 
points of view. In this book, I will state my position on a number of philosophical issues without 
any appreciable engagement with philosophical literature.
While the statements that I make are not inconsistent with what has been said by specialists in the various
issues involved, these will, however, not always be consistent with the position adopted by any particular
philosophical  camp. In  philosophy,  issues  are  discussed  and  analyzed  through debate  and  discourse,
rather than by reference to any independent ‘objective’ determinant of the validity of this or that position.
In looking into what the philosophers say on any particular question or issue, one often finds them to be
clustered  into  groups  around  leading  personalities  whose  theses  serve  as  nuclei  for  contending
viewpoints. However, I will, at times, cut across the various contending viewpoints and put together the
content of this book in what may appear to be a synthetic approach. Broadly speaking, I will be close to
the realist point of view, but here again, I will move across various different positions within the realist
camp. Indeed, I will be adopting a naturalist orientation while remaining committed to a broadly realist
point of view. Rather than burden you with an account of where my philosophical loyalties lie (I do not
have strong loyalties to speak of), my aim will be to tell you as clearly as I can, and to the best of my
understanding, how and to what extent scientific theories describe nature and where, in this, these bear the
stamp of extra-logical inferential leaps.
OBSERVATION INVOLVES INTERPRETATION
 To come back to the issue of the table and the electron, I will adopt the position that there is no 
big difference between the two from the point of view of scientific inquiry. The table top causes 
our visual sensory organ to be excited in a more or less direct manner while the causal link from 
the state of the electron to our sensory perception is much more indirect, mediated through a 
number of intermediate stages. My perception of the table, while apparently a simple and direct 
act, involves a complex process nevertheless, starting from the excitation of the visual organ, and
proceeding through a large number of transformations and associations in my mind, partly 
conscious and mostly unconscious. The result of these transformations can, in a sense, be 
compared with a theory, because a theory is likewise a complex thing even when it appears to be 
a simple one and because a theory is, like my visual perception, an interpretation of what our 
sense data, directly or indirectly received, communicate to us. My perception involves, much like
a scientific theory, a large number of associations and chains of reasoning, some explicit and 
some defined only implicitly. An electron causes transformations in the states of systems used 
for ‘observing’ it, and the actual act of observation is an inference based on some kind of a 
theory, this time mostly an explicit one, as to how and why such transformations occur. For 
instance, consider the statement that the voltage pulse in an ionization chamber is caused the by 
ionization of gas molecules by means of electromagnetic interactions. This, of course, is part of a
theory, a theory of what electromagnetic interactions are, a theory of how and when such 
interactions cause the ionization of a gas, and so on. All these remain implied when a scientist 
says that she has ‘observed an electron’. 
That  every  observation  is,  in  some  sense,  an  interpretation  in  terms  of  some  theory  lurking  in  the
background, has been the focus of protracted discussion in the philosophy of science. Norwood Russell
Hanson,  the  prolific  and  colourful  “Flying  Professor”  of  philosophy,  drew  attention  to  the  theory-
ladenness of observations [Hanson1], while Kuhn lent a great deal of weight to this view, within his own
terms of discourse, by underlining how the perception of a scientist depends on the world of beliefs and
theories she resides in ([Kuhn1], chapter 10). It is now commonly accepted that observations are indeed
conditioned  by  conceptions  of  a  theoretical  nature  ([Churchland],  [Medawar]) acquired  in  past
experience, and that there is no great distinction between the observable and unobservable parts of reality.
However,  the  theory-laden  nature  of  all  observations  has  lent  itself  to  other  interpretations  as  well,
notably  an  interpretation  espoused  by  anti-realism  in  general,  and  relativism [Brewer-Lambert] in
particular. If observation is theory-laden, then there is no independent determinant of reality since it is
through observations that we are supposed to come to our understanding of reality. In particular, various
alternative conceptions of reality are possible,  depending on the theoretical  framework we choose to
employ which, in essence, is the point of view of relativism. Of course, almost everything can be given an
interpretation  in  accordance  with  our  chosen  point  of  view,  and  the  idea  of  theory-ladenness  is  no
exception. For instance, one can say that our conception of reality is constituted by a complex interplay of
facts of observation, originating in an independently existing reality, and the framework of prior beliefs
and conceptions that we constantly make use of in interpreting the observations, which would be closer to
how I should like to express things. 
And,  as  for  relativism,  I  should  not  be  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  there  can  be  various  different
interpretations of any given part of reality, corresponding to various different ways we make sense of
facts  of  observation  in  terms  of  our  prior  beliefs  and  concepts,  so  long  as  we  recognize  that  these
interpretations are  all  oriented  towards  the  same  reality  – the latter  continues to exist  and to  evolve
without regard to how we interpret it. Moreover, the framework of beliefs and concepts that we use in
interpreting facts of observation cannot be just anything, constructed extempore at the bidding of our
whim, because any such framework is built in a protracted course of experience involving innumerable
acts of inference and interpretation in the past, ones moreover, that have been tested against earlier facts
of  observation.  It  may  very  well  be  that  there  are  more  than  one  such  frameworks,  depending  on
culturally acquired differences in modes of thought, but that still does not make these arbitrary, with little
commitment to explain an independently existing reality and, in particular,  to explain further facts of
observation as  these are  found in the course of  time.  It  is  here  that  the various different  theoretical
frameworks will have to face a reality check when some of these will prove ineffective, some less so and,
perchance, one among these alternative theories will get transformed into a broader and more powerful
theory to take on the continuing challenge of reality.                                       
But we should not digress too much. We adopt the position that, in a certain sense at least, the 
table and the electron are equally real and, on the other hand, our perception of either is akin to a 
theory. But, what does this actually mean? Does this make them amenable to unambiguous 
description by our theories? Here lies an open terrain that is not so easy to map. Because here, 
precisely, lies that gap between reality and our conception of reality. There must be something 
out there that is causally linked to my perception of the table or my conception of the electron. 
But that something is – I am rather tempted to say – quite fathomless. It gets only very partially 
and incompletely registered or mapped into my perception or conception or theory, whatever you
will. Consider, for instance, the table first. Is it that solid object made of wood that has four legs 
and a plane top that stands before me? Or, is it that collection of atoms or molecules that do not 
have precisely defined positions and are incessantly in vibrational motion around their mean 
positions, held together by invisible bonds and separated by vacuous spaces? Or is it a still more 
nebulous thing comprised of protons, neutrons and electrons, with all these corpuscles engaged 
in a crazy whirlwind of a dancing exercise? Or, even focusing on a single electron, what can one 
make of this astounding speck of reality? Is it a particle with a certain absurdly small mass, a 
certain quantum of charge, a certain ‘spin’ (in the jargon of physics), and so on? Or, is it, once 
again, something completely different, like, say, a certain state of a wave field? 
OBSERVATIONS  ARE  PARTIAL:  MULTIPLE  LAYERS  OF  DESCRIPTION
Whatever reality is out there, it seems to be really pretty inscrutable! Every single bit of reality 
has multiple levels of description. And each of these multiple levels invokes a picture of that bit 
of reality utterly different from the one evoked by another level. You will find realists (many of 
them scientists, really) who refuse to be intimidated by these multiple layers of reality and rather 
take it in their stride without making much mystery about it, telling you that this is the most 
natural thing to be expected of science which goes ever deeper into the description and 
explanation of the real world, discovering ever more fundamental modes of description. Indeed, 
probing nature at greater and greater depths is the specific business of the scientists (we are 
principally talking of physics and physicists here, but our discourse, generally speaking, will be 
inclusive of other disciplines as well), which is why they are quite so nonchalant about these 
multiple levels of description. 
Here, though, is a question that requires serious thought. Our conception of the world goes on 
changing like, for instance, from the conception of the table as a single object to the table as a 
collection of atoms and molecules, to the same table as a collection of protons, neutrons, and 
electrons, and so on. Evidently, none of these conceptual changes was accompanied with a 
corresponding change in the world itself, which means that the thing out there that we refer to as 
the table remains its old self, whatever that self is. While the world does not change, our 
conception of it changes, and changes rather radically. This, of course, testifies to the existence 
of the gap between the world and our conception of it. But, granted that the gap is there, what 
can one say of the successive stages that our conception of the world passes through?
Even as I have depicted the successive stages of our conception of the table as differing drastically from
one another,  the  actual  process  of  change  in  our  conceptual  world  is,  in  most  cases,  more  gradual.
Conceptions don’t change overnight. There was a more or less  prolonged stage when people did not
know of electrons and protons, but had a fairly good idea that matter is made up of atoms and molecules.
The concept of electrons, protons and neutrons, and their role in the structure of atoms and molecules
took a long time developing and maturing. But at the end, people did arrive at a theory of structure of
matter  that  looked radically  different  from the theory  based on atoms and molecules  as  the ultimate
building blocks. 
This, indeed, is a tricky question. Science is supposed to give a true picture of the world. Which 
of the successive conceptual stages I mentioned above, are true, in the sense of being a correct 
representation of the object out there we have been referring to as ‘the table’? Evidently, not all 
of these conceptual representations can be true at the same time. Okay, so can we say that none 
of these is true by itself in any absolute sense, but that these are more and more accurate 
representations of ‘the’ truth? This is the view that most realists, and most scientists, appear to 
subscribe to. 
We will have more to say on this later in chapter 9, where we will see how complex the concept of truth 
about nature is. Briefly stated, truth has two aspects to it, one relating to the mental process of arriving at 
truth – a process that results in an interpretation of some part of nature, and not in an exact description of 
it, and the other relating to nature itself, to which the truth pertains. The first of these two aspects can, in a
sense, be said to belong to the domain of epistemology, and the second to that of ontology. 
I have referred to the irreducible gap between nature and our conception of it. It is precisely because of 
that gap that our scientific theories, however successful and accurate these are, are interpretations, and not
exact descriptions of nature. The gap relates to the fact that there is no mechanism by which nature as a 
whole imprints an exact copy of itself on our minds. Instead, numerous signals originating in the world 
out there, transmitted through various channels of observation, stimulate our senses and these stimulations
then interact with conceptions stored in our minds that have been produced in a long series of past 
experiences. It is due to this specific manner of processing of incoming information in the light of past 
experience, where the incoming information is filtered in a selective manner, depending on current goals 
and our cognitive and perceptual capabilities, that all our inferences and theories assume the nature of 
interpretations. The contrary and complex nature of truth resides precisely in the fact that the vehicle of 
truth is an interpretation rather than an exact description.  It is this that lies underneath all the clashes, 
conflicts, and turmoil in everyday life, where men have to exercise their judgment to approach truth, but 
have no magic wand of judgment at their disposal.
In scientific investigations, however, that magic wand is, in a sense, provided by nature itself because 
here a standard of judgement emerges through repeated processes of experimentation, observation, and 
confirmation. While none of these processes elevates a scientific theory from the status of an 
interpretation to that of objective truth in any absolute and logical sense, we will assume that the scientific
process, to all intents and purposes, is capable of interpreting parts of nature within given domains of 
investigation in an impersonal  way, i.e., in a manner independent of the process of interpretation 
occurring in the minds of individuals and groups of individuals. However, so far as an understanding of 
nature as a whole is concerned, a scientific theory, in spite of the elaborate process of justification that 
elevates it to the status of an impersonal interpretation, remains an interpretation nevertheless, since it 
captures only some limited aspect of nature, and is contextual, where the idea of context is again a 
complex one, involving ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects, as we will see below. As a consequence, the 
evolution of scientific theories is not a smooth one since there occurs a dramatic restructuring of a theory 
as the external context of observation and interaction with nature gets changed, and also as the internal 
context, made up of the existing framework of our ideas, evolves with time. In other words, the way a 
succession of scientific theories captures the truth about some part of nature cannot, generally speaking, 
be described in simple terms as a cumulative approach where some ultimate truth is approximated more 
and more closely.
THE  EXISTENCE  OF  OBJECTS,  AND  THEIR  RELATEDNESS  TO  ONE  ANOTHER
 
In speaking of the ontological aspect of truth, it is really not enough to speak just of the existence
of the world, along with all its parts that we observe either directly or indirectly. Mere existence 
does not tell us anything. What is of vital importance is the relatedness of objects in the world to 
one another, because it is the relatedness that tells us how objects behave, what rules, if any, they
conform to, and how we can act back on parts of the world. It is the relatedness of an object with
other objects that tells us of its qualities or properties, and the properties are precisely the aspects
of an object that give it distinction and identity. The properties of the table identify it distinctly 
from the chairs arranged around it or from the floor on which it stands. So, the correct 
ontological statement would be that the table, the chairs, the floor, and all such things exist and 
are related to one another in a manner independent of our mind and of how our mind attempts to 
know of their existence and relatedness. 
However, the existence of objects and their relatedness to one another, make up a single whole.  It is only
provisionally that one can distinguish between the aspect of existence of natural objects and that of their
manifold  correlations,  appearing  as  their  properties  and  mutual  interactions,  of  potentially  infinite
complexity. The distinction between the existence of things and their properties and mutual interactions
arises from our experience of nature, and is also routinely accepted in scientific practice where an entity
with some definite properties is first postulated to exist, which is then assumed to interact  with other
entities similarly postulated. However, the properties postulated to characterize an object are themselves
indicative of some of its previously acknowledged characteristics – ones that have already been learnt
about it.
THEORIES  AS  DESCRIPTIONS  OF  INTER-RELATIONS
All our inferences and theories are actually designed to tell us how the things in the world are 
related to one another. In the context of our attempt to know of this world, it is the relatedness 
that is of primary importance. Another way of saying this would be that we come to know of the 
existence of objects in terms of their qualities and properties. And, in order to learn what the 
properties are, how an object is related to other objects, we ourselves interact with it, either 
directly through our senses, or by examining it by means of other objects, by examining its 
relatedness to these other objects. In any case, the properties revealed to us this way depend on 
how we set up the interaction with it, the context in which the interaction is set up.
To those of you who have an acquaintance with  quantum theory, the above paragraph might look like a
reference  to  the  notorious  measurement  problem,  because  the  measurement  problem  is  crucially
dependent  on the  context defining the measuring process.  However,  I  do  not specifically  refer  to the
quantum measurement problem in our discourse. The type of contextuality I refer to is relevant to the
observation of objects in general, where the objects are found to reveal aspects of nature in a manner that
depends  on  the  context  of  observation.  The  context-dependence  of  observations  in  quantum
measurements  constitutes  a  very  distinctive  instance  where  microscopic  systems  are  found  to  differ
radically from large scale (macroscopic) ones. It seems to me to be a plausible position to adopt that
quantum contextuality I use the term ‘contextuality’ to denote ‘context-dependence’) is something that is
continuous with, and at the same time constitutes a very special case of, the contextuality inherent in the
observation  of  natural  objects  and  processes  in  general.  But  we  will  not  confine  ourselves  to  stray
remarks,  and  will  initiate  our  discourse  on  contextuality  in  the  next  section,  postponing  further
discussions to later occasions.
   
ALL  OBSERVATIONS  AND  THEORIES  ARE  CONTEXTUAL
What I mean by contextuality in the observation of natural objects and processes can be 
explained with the help of a number of examples. The context in the observation of an electron in
an ionization chamber when the electron possesses a relatively low energy differs from the 
context where the observation is made in the setting of a scattering experiment or in some other 
similar setting where the particles involved in the experiment possess a sufficiently high energy. 
One then comes to conclude that the electron is not even a well-defined particle (or a particle-
wave in the quantum mechanical sense), but is a certain state of a field. Low energy and high 
energy contexts are seen here to reveal radically different aspects of nature. It does not really 
matter that this example relates to the quantum world because it makes us aware of the general 
fact that any observation of an object or an entity gives us a conception of just a cross-section or 
a tiny piece of nature, a cross-section determined by the context of the observation. What is 
objective is the cross-section in question, and the concepts and theories built up for the purpose 
of representing that cross-section can be faithful and accurate, to whatever degree possible, only 
within the context – the ‘external’ aspect of it.
On the other hand, at any given stage of development of scientific theories, there exists a vast
web of ideas and concepts related to one another, where these concepts are clustered into more or
less coherent wholes – the theories, that give us a picture of nature, a map to tell us what things
there are and how they behave. However, this vast and complex web is a dynamic one. Concepts
and theories – resources that constitute the ‘internal’ context of observation and theory building –
get transformed depending on the way science looks at nature. In other words, there occurs an
evolution  of  the  external  and internal  contexts  caused  by  a  broadening  of  the  scope  of
observation of natural things and their behaviour, as also by a restructuring of the conceptual
web.  New  aspects –  or  ‘dimensions’  –  of  nature  are  thereby  captured  in  the  concepts  and
theories, amounting to a radical transformation in the picture of nature that the sciences build up
for us. 
A good way to illustrate the idea of the context is to refer to the practice of  engineering drawing 
where engineers and architects prepare plans, elevations, and sections to represent aspects of a 
complex three dimensional object, say, a grand architectural structure, on a two dimensional 
drawing sheet. These appear as distinct drawings on the sheet, where each of these drawings 
represents (possibly with quite exquisite faithfulness and accuracy), some aspect of the structure 
in some context of representation. Thus, there can be several elevations for observations from 
several different sides (each, therefore, constituting some particular context of observation), 
while a top view (a different context altogether) gives the plan. And, additionally, numerous 
sections may be necessary for a detailed description of what the interior looks like and what the 
internal structure of each interior object is (like, for instance, whether a pillar is hollow or a solid 
one). When done by architectural experts on the basis of detailed survey, each of the drawings 
correspond to some aspect of the structure to be described faithfully and accurately (hence, 
objectively, though with some unavoidable error which we need not take cognizance of for the 
present), but none is a representation of the object itself. The object itself, which is most 
definitely ‘out there’, appears in our concept only as fractional representations which we 
continually attempt to synthesize in our mind, and the real question that then comes up is, in what
relation does the synthesized concept stand to the ‘reality’ since, in a very definite sense, the 
former is an interpretation of the latter. 
While the program of science is similar to the architect’s attempts at drawing up plans, elevations, and
sections, it  differs in one fundamental and profound respect:  an architectural  structure is an object of
which the description by means of plans and elevations can, in a sense, approach more and closely the
‘object itself’ (though, even this is arguable: but we will not be too insistent on finer issues) since the
structure has (again, arguably) only a finite number of distinct aspects, or ‘dimensions’, to it. In contrast,
nature is inexhaustible in its aspects (‘dimensions’) and presents an unending succession of facets for
scientific theories to capture and to  describe. 
I will now pause to draw a few significant conclusions from the example of the electron and of 
the architectural marvel. The architecture is out there for all to see and to wonder at, while the 
electron (or whatever it is that we call an electron) is hidden from our bare senses, but there are 
common aspects to our conception of the two. First of all, the architecture is not really for all to 
see and visualize since there are hidden aspects in it too – and I don’t refer here to the fact that it 
is made up of electrons and protons or of quarks or whatever, but to the more mundane fact that 
some of the pillars may be internally hollow while some others are solid, some of the stones are 
impregnated with gems and the surfaces of some of the domes are serrated, and so on. Every 
time some new aspects of the structure are revealed to us in some new context of observation, a 
new synthesis is made in our mind that alters and replaces the conception that was previously 
there. What is important to note is that this alteration is a qualitative one, and not just an 
improvement in accuracy and faithfulness and, in this sense, is a replacement. Contrast this with 
the other type of improvement of representation that an engineer or architect often effects, 
namely, an improvement in the accuracy of a drawing within any given context like, say, altering
slightly some particular angle in a plan or elevation drawing, which also constitutes a 
replacement, but of a relatively simple nature, namely, a quantitative one.
Another illuminating analogy (or, an instance, if you will) as to how our conception of nature gets 
conditioned by the context, is obtained by referring to the way we appraise the personality structure of an 
individual. Our ‘reading’ of her depends on the various different circumstances in which we observe her 
response to environmental inputs and, additionally, what our current theory of mind is – in particular, 
what our current appraisal of her is, because it is the current appraisal that acts as a conditioning factor to 
how we set up our interaction with her. There are infinitely many aspects to her personality that even a 
lifetime of probing and interaction will not bring out to the full. Indeed, the very concept of a personality 
to discover and describe, is not a substantive one. We discover a person bit by bit, but it never amounts to 
discovering the person as such, whatever the ‘person’ stands for. A routinely known aspect of her 
response to her environment may undergo a spectacular change as some components of that environment 
get changed. What is more, our conception of the person also undergoes sea changes as we get to know 
her across a spectrum of circumstances.  
Thus, the epistemological question of our conception of the existence of things is related in a 
complex manner to the ontological question of their existence in reality. My conception of the 
existence of the table or of the electron is dependent on the context of my observation and 
experimentation, where the context reveals only a slice of the reality I am looking at, made up of 
only a few of the infinite number of aspects or ‘dimensions’ of the latter. And that conception 
gets altered quite spectacularly in successive stages as the context gets broadened more and 
more, with an ever increasing number of ‘dimensions’ or ‘layers’ of the entities brought under 
the scanner. Finally, this external aspect of the context is supplemented by and interacts with the 
internal aspect I mentioned earlier, the two together making up the overall context in which we 
make observations and build theories in our engagement with nature. 
THEORETICAL  CONCEPTS:  GREATER  AND  GREATER  DEPTHS  IN  A  LAYERED  DESCRIPTION
What is more, the gap between the reality out there and our conception of that reality gets even 
more intriguing when one considers objects and entities, not only in their aspect of existence, but
of their quality, correlation, and interaction, of the mechanisms underlying their multifarious 
interactions. As I have mentioned, the question of the existence of a table or of an electron is 
inextricably woven into the question of how it relates to the rest of reality, what the properties of 
the table or of the electron are, what the mechanisms of its interactions with other entities are. 
The world exists as a whole and it is only in our minds that we perceive, first, objects in 
individual existence and, then, the behaviour of objects in interaction and evolution, manifest in 
their innumerable qualities.
For instance, consider a pair of particles A and B. Now, the mere existence of A and B is a rather
trivial matter to worry about. One has to look at how these two are related between themselves, 
how they interact, how they influence one another, and it is this that makes our conception of 
their individual existence really meaningful. And it is here that our concepts take a spectacular 
dive into depths that may in the end prove to be fathomless. Because, now we are concerned not 
just about the existence of the two particles, but about how best to describe their relatedness. 
And, just as the existence question is no less conceptual than observational, the relatedness 
question is equally, if not more, so.
Continuing to refer to the two particles A and B, each of the two can be said to move through a 
succession of positions depending on their initial positions and velocities, and on their mutual 
interaction. Physicists describe the latter in terms of a certain interaction potential, which 
determine the trajectory of each of the two, a curve in three dimensional space. Now, these are 
concepts at a different level compared to just the concept of either particle existing by itself or 
even to the concept of the joint existence of the two particles – concepts of interaction and 
trajectory may be, in this sense, said to be derived ones. And conceptual complexities continue to
crop up at every small step that one takes in describing the behaviour of the two particles in their 
aspect of relatedness, where concepts derived in successive stages make their appearance. Thus, 
for instance, it is not enough to speak of the trajectory as a succession of positions occupied by 
either particle at successive instants of time because, of equal importance is the sequence of 
velocities, or their momenta, at the successive positions. One thereby gets to the idea of a 
trajectory or a curve, not in our familiar three dimensional space, but in a six dimensional one 
(the so-called phase space) for either particle. The dizzying journey does not stop here, for, one 
has to refer to a twelve dimensional phase space so as to properly describe, in general terms, the 
joint motion of the two particles under their mutual interaction. But, hold on. Perhaps we are 
getting carried away in our newfound enthusiasm with ideas. Why should one go over to a six 
dimensional or a twelve dimensional space, and why should it not be possible to keep things 
concrete and describe the motion of two or, if we like, any number of particles, in our good old 
world of three dimensions? 
It is certainly possible to describe the motion of any number of particles by referring to just the 
three dimensional space and a set of mathematical functions. Indeed, the higher dimensional 
spaces are convenient geometrical constructs for describing features of the functions that one 
needs in the three dimensional description, but before dismissing these in favour of the 
mathematical functions in the three dimensional setting, one has to recognize that the 
mathematical functions themselves are constructs of a similar nature. However, the higher 
dimensional spaces force themselves more and more into our reckoning as we go on to describe 
more and more complex aspects of the mutual influence of the two particles on the motion of 
each other, or to consider the interactions of a larger number of particles with one another. In 
attempting to describe the motion of a system of particles, there arise questions of greater and 
greater depth – ones of greater and greater intrinsic complexity – questions that are virtually 
impossible to settle in the setting of the familiar three dimensional space.  Phase spaces of 
arbitrary numbers of dimensions then become a necessity, and instead of the interaction 
potential, one then more conveniently makes use of the Hamiltonian function of the system of 
particles under consideration.
THR  BIG  QUESTION:  HOW  DO  THEORIES  CORRESPOND  TO  REALITY?
It will not do to go on here with examples of how abstract and labyrinthine our theories of the 
mutual interactions of objects and entities can be and how much of a success those theories can 
prove to be. What is of importance to note here is that, the vast and intricate web of interrelations
between objects and entities in nature is necessarily described in terms of theories of a more or 
less complex nature, theories involving concepts and constructs that appear to be remote from 
the things existing out there. It is, of course, meaningless to ask whether a Hamiltonian function 
exists in nature. And equally meaningless to ask if there exist twelve dimensional phase spaces or
ones of even higher dimensions. Our description and explanation of interrelations among objects 
is utterly and incorrigibly conceptual and theoretical, involving theoretical constructs. Granted 
that such constructs turn out to be immensely successful in answering subtle questions and 
explaining deep and complex phenomena, are these constructs anything more than mere 
instruments that help us set up explanations, without having something in them that can be 
identified as truth ? Do the theoretical constructs correspond to some mechanisms intrinsic to 
nature? Do the sciences converge in ever greater measure to these intrinsic mechanisms that are 
‘out there’ for us to discover?
I am not sure if anybody can produce a definitive answer to this. Evidently, the theoretical 
constructs are not mere instruments assembled fortuitously, helping us with explanations of 
phenomena so that we can, by making use of these constructs, identify and predict regularities 
and correlations with uncanny success. That would be miracle indeed. Like many other realists, I
don’t opt for miracles. But then, what is there in the hidden mechanisms of nature that these 
complex theoretical constructs represent, or correspond to? A theory, along with its constructs, 
must in some way hit upon ‘correctly’ some mechanism inherent in nature so as to be 
overwhelmingly successful in some area of scientific enquiry. As I see it, this is the central 
question that scientific realism has to figure out with some clarity before one can adequately 
demarcate between the points of view of realism and antirealism.
The viewpoint of scientific realism has many facets, of which this question relates to an important one. In
the end, however aligning oneself with realism or antirealism is not a matter of hard logic, but one of
choosing a position on the basis of shared perceptions and insights. In real life, we often adopt decisions
that  cannot  be  proved to  be  correct  on  logical  grounds  (this,  indeed,  is  the  hallmark  of  inductive
inference),  but we can still try to  evaluate those by referring to various circumstantial and contextual
factors. Deliberations and judgments are no less important in this world than logical proofs.
The  No-Miracle  Argument was  made  famous  by  the  American  mathematician-philosopher   Hilary
Putnam who presented it in favour of the point of view of scientific realism in a paper on the philosophy
of mathematics ([Putnam], a collection of essays). Bas van Fraassen, who has countered the point of view
of scientific realism (or, more precisely, of the point of view that recognizes successful scientific theories
as  being  endowed  with  truth)  with  his  own  constructive  empiricism,  has  dubbed it  as  the  ‘ultimate
argument’ for realism [van Fraassen], perhaps implying that, tragically, there is no better argument than
this in support of realism which, strictly speaking, is no argument at all. Fraassen has advanced his own
explanation of the success of scientific theories – one where success is not much more than the outcome
of a process of ‘survival’ by competition: a theory survives the competition from other theories because it
happens to have “latched on to actual regularities in nature”. Notably, he accepts here the position of
metaphysical realism, which speaks of a reality to which all our theories are addressed 
I should mention here that we are now referring principally to mathematical  and, in a broader sense,
theoretical constructs in science, that are mostly encountered in theories in the physical sciences. The
uncanny effectiveness of these constructs of exquisite mathematical depth is indeed a matter of genuine
puzzlement  when one pauses to think over these.  The Nobel winning mathematical  physicist  Eugene
Wigner  [Wigner1] famously expressed  this  in  an article  entitled “The Unreasonable  Effectiveness  of
Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”, and several other leading mathematical physicists have expressed a
similar sense of wonder and mystery in the fact that mathematical structures, predominantly in the nature
of mental constructs, are found to be relevant in the explanation of mind-independent natural phenomena.
However, the issue is of general relevance in the philosophy of science where theoretical constructs are
effectively made use of in explaining observed aspects of reality in all the scientific disciplines.
What is more important than proclaiming oneself as belonging to this or that camp in philosophy is to try
to gain genuine understanding, even without the benefit of logical proof, of how things operate in this
world of ours. And the question of how the deeply theoretical constructs of science correspond to, or
represent, the mechanisms of nature, stands out as one of paramount importance.  
It is not enough to say that the theoretical constructs are ‘true’ in the sense of corresponding with
features and relations existing in nature because, to me at least, this sounds much like a statement
of faith. One has to understand with some clarity what this correspondence actually consists of. 
Can one say, for instance, that there is a correspondence between relations among elements of a 
theory and the web of relations existing between natural entities? While this is also vague and 
unsatisfactory, I will use this as the base camp from where one can have a view of the really 
intriguing questions concerning the world and our existence in it.
A metaphorical  description of  how mathematical  constructs  turn out to be relevant  in explaining the
mechanisms inherent  to a mind-independent  reality is  that the mind, taking in cues from an external
reality, spins out webs of its own, based on rules of logic and mathematics, and some of these webs latch
on to aspects of reality. Of course, the webs spun out with threads of logic and mathematics, all  hang
together, and so do all the various parts of reality and all the mechanisms inherent in these.    
Inferences and theories are  produced in a psychological process in which beliefs of various degrees of
generality play a significant role, as we will see later in this book, but as they acquire a finished form,
they pass through a process of justification, both in the mind of the individual and in the collective mind
of the scientific community, though ‘justification’ and ‘discovery’ are often inextricably mixed with each
other (in this context, see [Feyerabend], chapter 15). An aspect of justification of overriding importance is
consistency – the quality that makes our theories and concepts hang together. Our beliefs, however need
not be consistent – some beliefs resist justification and consistency check. Remarkably, the belief system
of an individual or of a community  still hangs together. This is because beliefs are tied together with
emotions (this we will have a look at in chapter 6 below).
SUMMARY:  THE  ISSUES  OF  RELEVANCE
Before I go on, I will summarize for you what we have had so far – the position I want to adopt 
as also the issues that it leads up to. For the sake of easy reference, I will make up a list.
1. There exists a mind-independent reality: this is a matter of inference from our experience,
and not one of logical certainty; there exist alternative points of view, any of which one 
may adopt, depending on how one summarizes and interprets one’s experience in life and
the experience gained by mankind in the course of history.
Our existence in a real world entails innumerable problems and conflicts that we have to cope with
and move through; the responsibility lies on us to understand and explain the multitude of events
into which we are thrust, including social interactions with people around us. For this, we make
use of  our  naturally  evolved  inquisitiveness  and  capacities  of  inference.  We interact  with the
reality around us and form hypotheses and theories in order to explain why things happen. This is
vital for our continued existence, and continued autonomy and authenticity in that existence.
2. In explaining the inner mechanisms of nature by means of scientific theories, we arrive at
concepts that involve entities that are not directly observable – ones whose existence we 
infer by indirect observations and reasoning. However, the existence of the unobservable 
entities is not to be doubted solely because of this. In the course of development of 
scientific theories, the inferences about these entities are made more and more reliable, 
and little doubt now remains regarding entities, about the existence of which strong 
doubts were entertained in the past.
At the same time, inferences may be fallible, and it cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty that 
some of the unobservable entities assumed to exist in our current scientific theories will have to be 
defined in a new light in days to come. Indeed, the existence of a certain entity, such as the 
electron, is quite distinct from our description of it, and the latter can and does change radically 
from time to time.
3. While any object of nature exists and interacts with other objects independently of our 
conception of it, that conception keeps on changing dramatically, as the context in which 
we interact with and observe nature gains in depth and breadth, and as our conceptual 
framework itself gets enriched. Our description of things and processes in nature, and our
explanations of phenomena, is effected by means of theories, where the latter are 
generated in a cognitive process. Broadly speaking, that process originates with signals 
and stimuli from objects in interaction, and then proceeds through a number of complex 
stages: the signals and stimuli generate internal responses (neuropsychological, 
emotional, somatic) and these responses initiate further processing where our past 
experience in the form of beliefs and concepts assume relevance. The consequence of all 
this is that our theories describe parts of nature in a selective manner, in the form of 
interpretations.
4. All observations of facts of the world are fundamentally cognitive in nature, and the 
cognitive processing of one and the same fact of the world may result in various different 
interpretations of it. Scientific theories are not determined solely by facts of nature – the 
latter only act as the causal origin of the former. The theories are formed in a cognitive 
process in the form of a selective and purposive interpretation, being conditioned by past 
experience, and by past beliefs, conceptions, and theories. Observations are theory-laden.
5. Scientific theories constitute a continuation of inferences we make in the course of our 
daily life, where these inferences provide the basis for our decisions and actions. In the 
making of these inferences, we interpret the world around us by making use of our 
cognitive abilities and, at the same time, keep on enriching and transforming that 
interpretation as the context of our interaction with the world changes and, at the same 
time, as our overall conceptual framework gets enriched. What is special in the case of 
scientific investigations is the great emphasis on repeated cross-verification against facts 
of observation, on rigorous consistency checks against a vast web of currently existing 
concepts, and on discourse among members of a community of fellow scientists where 
rules of inference agreed upon by the entire community are made use of. This tends to 
make scientific theories free, to all intents and purposes, of relativism, in contrast to 
inferences of a non-scientific nature, where interpretations often vary from person to 
person, and from one group of persons to another.
This aspect of enhanced reality check notwithstanding, scientific theories continue to be 
in the nature of interpretations of reality, since these capture only certain aspects of 
nature through a cognitive process as outlined above.
Even though impersonal to a large extent, scientific theories bear the stamp of their origin in the
cognitive processes of men and of groups of men. The course of development of the theories is
conditioned  by  modes of  thought  of  communities  and  by  cultural traits  and  latent  beliefs  of
societies.
6. Scientific theories aim at providing us with effective descriptions of entities and 
mechanisms constituting reality, an effectiveness that is supposed to imply truth. 
However, the concept of truth is a complex one since, on the one hand, it relates to a 
mind-independent reality and, on the other, resides in inferences and theories that act as 
vehicles of it, the latter being produced by cognitive processes in the minds of men. This 
contrariness results in a fundamental tension that cannot be reconciled by logical 
discourse alone. However, that is how everything in life turns out to be – no concept is 
ever pure and free of contrary aspects, least of all the concept of truth. 
This, however, does not make invalid the concept itself. Truth is not delivered to us ready and tied
in a neat package. Mankind has to struggle for it, and struggle with all intensity and commitment
to achieve authenticity, as it has had to do in the past.  
There is no denying the irreducible gap between Nature and its workings, and the model world 
that science assembles for us in the form of the great web of concepts and theories, that makes 
realism a matter of a stand or a viewpoint that we adopt in our own life process – a viewpoint 
arrived at in experience, and not as a logically compelling conclusion. At the same time, the gap 
relates solely to the fact that our perception of reality is cognitive in nature. Nature does not 
know of any such gap. Signals originating in the world interact with our cognitive apparatus, and 
we as cognitive agents, on reflecting upon our cognitive process, become aware of what we 
describe as a gap. Looked at from outside the cognitive process (in so far as such a thing is 
possible), the whole affair is nothing but an interaction between parts of the world and our 
cognitive apparatus (with all its ‘software’ of concepts and theories) – just another instance of 
the vast web of interactions going on between parts of nature. The mysteries of epistemology 
arise only as we make an abstraction, for our own benefit, of questions of epistemology from 
ontology.  
What is more, the cognitive process itself knows of no great distinction between the pre-
scientific and the scientific. Our web of scientific theories has parts of it built up through 
experiences gained in non-scientific and pre-scientific practice, and the rest is assembled by 
scientific exploration, where inter-personal differences in interpretation are sought to be 
minimized. This lends a new complexion to scientific theories that can be likened to an edifice 
built upon a substratum of loose ground, not as coherent as the edifice itself. But that is precisely 
how all edifices are built.
“Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a 
swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but 
not down to any natural or "given" base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have 
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being.” (Karl R. Popper, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, quoted in       
[ Magnani1]).
We will now have a look at all these issues relating to the scientific process and its relation to 
cognitive activities of men, but there is one other thing to take note of before we can proceed.
The questions that are coming up are not as much in the domain of science as such, as in that of 
philosophy of science. If the theories of science constitute a distilled essence of our experience 
with reality, then philosophy of science, in turn, constitutes the distilled essence of those very 
theories. If the scientific concepts and theories are arrived at by acts of inductive inference, then 
the points of view one adopts in philosophy of science are, in turn, arrived at by induction of a 
higher order.
Philosophies are produced not by the passive application of universally accepted  rules but by a choice
from among alternatives, where a choice cannot be right or wrong but can only be more plausible or less
so. The alternatives are, fundamentally speaking, not many, because philosophical ideas are made up of
only few building blocks when compared with the vast and awe-inspiring array of concepts the scientist
works with. But the scientist has an arbiter standing in front of her to whom she and her fellow travellers
defer in judging the worth of their theories – Nature herself. To the philosopher, on the other hand, Nature
does not proffer any yardstick for judging right or wrong – she only smiles enigmatically (however, even
for the scientist, the yardstick does not come ready-made; but more of that later). Science creates a new
world for itself every time the horizon of mankind’s interaction with nature expands; philosophy only
recreates the world – a world built in contemplation.
What makes philosophy a really challenging exercise is the innumerable nuances that the few basic ideas
are combined with. Where the scientist works with a great variety of building blocks, erecting structures
of awe-inspiring complexity, the philosopher works with clay – only a few colours of it – to which she
gives innumerable  shapes.  The philosopher of today works with the same old clay and the same old
colours that the philosophers of antiquity worked with, but the shapes made up by the two differ much,
because the edifice that science assembles goes on being built and built. While the edifice of scientific
theories is built in successive episodes upon the existing edifice and takes on ever-expanding fantastic
forms, philosophies are  re-built. There appear  cycles in philosophy, where old ideas are worked anew,
worked in new contexts, because the philosophy of science works on scientific theories – theories that
keep evolving in fantastic ways. And, precisely because of this, philosophical practice is forever filled up
with polemic, with exchanges between rival camps. In contrast, scientific practice involves polemic only
during the phase of emergence of a new theory, or at a time the existing theory proves sterile in solving
new problems while no definitive shape of a successor has emerged. Once a new theory proves its worth,
polemic is replaced with feverish, predominantly co-operative - perhaps competitive as well - work in the
journey forward. In philosophy, you can say nothing really new, you can only adopt a different way of
looking at things. And, it is precisely because of this that there cannot be sharp and lasting demarcation
lines between the various camps that philosophical thought is divided into. Old demarcation lines dissolve
and new ones appear. Contrasting ideas appear to be irreconcilable and mutually exclusive only when
these are allowed to be bled of life by being defined with empty words – words that don’t really apply to
the context at hand. 
While one is to choose between realism and antirealism, it is by no means a matter of a simple 
dichotomous choice between two mutually exclusive clusters of ideas. There do exist mutually 
exclusive cores to these two positions in philosophy, but the cores do not exhaust the entire 
philosophical terrain and it really makes no sense to carve up the entire terrain into mutually 
exclusive clusters of ideas. On the contrary, it may be immensely fruitful to think of novel 
combinations of elements of ideas that have so long been assumed to belong to one or the other 
of these mutually exclusive clusters. Indeed such novel blending of ideas picked out from what 
previously appeared to belong to irreconcilable camps, may be more in consonance with the 
developments eternally taking place in the sciences where, again, old frontiers dissolve and new 
areas of exploration emerge at an astounding pace. Indeed, explorations for a workable position 
in the philosophy of science are to be conducted in close affinity to developments in the sciences,
taking care that such explorations are constrained by these developments, by the successes and 
failures of scientific theories. This, broadly speaking, is the naturalist position in the philosophy 
of science.
This has been the way Philip Kitcher’s position in the philosophy of science appears to have evolved over
the years. For instance, [Diéguez] indicates how Kitcher’s realism has undergone a process of moderation
as his views have broadened during the years between the writings of [Kitcher1] and [Kitcher2]. Even at
the time of [Kitcher1], Kitcher speaks of a “vast middle ground” between extremes in issues relating to
scientific realism. 
I will, then, close this chapter on the note that we will, with these few strands of ideas introduced
here, again face the question we started with: in what sense does science describe the workings 
of nature ? As I understand, there is no clear-cut answer to the question, which is to be 
approached, not head-on, but only from the standpoint of our own cognitive processes, of how 
we perceive the world. In the end, however, all these make sense only when looked in relation to 
the question as to how we perceive ourselves. This is the question of values, of our goals and 
purposes: the ultimate testing ground of mankind.
CHAPTER 3  
THE EMERGENCE OF THEORIES: HOW ARE THEORIES CONSTRUCTED AND 
ACCEPTED ? 
The explorers in science: individuals and scientific communities
It seems reasonable to describe this fusion of the
 personal and the objective as Personal Knowledge.
Michael Polanyi
This book aims at addressing two complementary aspects of science from two distinct, though 
related, perspectives. The first of the two starts by considering science to be a product of 
humankind without overt concern as to how the product came to be. In reality, science is done by
human beings in their individual capacity and as members of groups of people – each as a 
member of her own immediate group or community of fellow scientists, as a member of a bigger 
scientific community, and as one belonging to groups of fellow human beings sharing various 
different identities and cultural components; and this constitutes the second of the two aspects of 
science mentioned above. The first of the two perspectives was adopted in the last chapter. We 
will adopt the second perspective now. However, we will see by and by that the two perspectives
are inextricably woven into each other.
THE  ESSENTIAL  TENSION:  THE  OBJECTIVE  AND  THE  SUBJECTIVE
Theories in science are constructs relating to aspects of reality. And herein lies the great tension 
in the world of science: on the one hand, theories have a causal link to slices of reality, 
depending on the context of our confrontation with these, and, on the other, these are constructs 
– constructs produced in the minds of individuals and groups. On the one hand, science is to be 
loyal to nature while, on the other, it is an interpretation of nature produced by people whose 
world of concepts is separated by an irreducible gap from the ‘real world out there’. I have 
raised, in the last chapter, the question as to how and in what sense science can be said to be 
loyal to nature. This chapter will deal with the other aspect – that of the way the scientific 
theories are generated in the conceptual world of individuals and groups or communities. We 
will then proceed to a more complete and meaningful discourse where these two aspects are 
merged with each other, making possible a composite picture of science as an evolving map of 
nature, as revealed in the minds of people.
 
Science is supposed to be ‘objective’ not only in the sense of being loyal to nature but in that of 
being loyal to nature alone, being free of the vagaries of the minds of individuals and of 
communities of individuals. However, like the first of these two suppositions, the second too is 
burdened with big question marks hanging over it. This is what we will have a look at now.
But even before we proceed with an examination of how science is dependent on the conceptual edifice
already there in the minds of people, I must caution you not to read too much into any one of the two
perspectives I have mentioned above to the exclusion of the other. In philosophy, as in everyday life, we
do have a tendency of reading too much into a single idea and losing foothold. This, for instance, is what I
refer to by speaking of the big divide between realism and antirealism. Realists speak of science being, in
some sense or other, true to Nature, and are sceptical of allusions to the mind-dependence (and culture-
dependence  too,  but  culture-dependence  can  be  looked  at  within  the  broader  perspective  of  mind-
dependence)  of  science,  while  antirealists  have  the  opposite  tendency  of  emphasizing  the  mind-
dependence at the cost of the allegiance of science to nature. In reality, however, the two are blended into
a single whole that we call science. It is only for the sake of convenience of discourse that we can effect a
separation  between  the  two,  where  we allow ourselves  to  forget  the  essential  fusion of  and  tension
between these.
SCIENCE ON A PEDESTAL
The first three quarters of the twentieth century saw great and dizzying advances in science 
where remarkable theories were built and, in a concomitant development, a certain mind-set was 
developed, whereby Science was placed on a pedestal. Science was seen as something 
transcending human fallibility, as a tightly knit body of knowledge, based on and regulated by 
the inexorable laws of logic, where the individual human being had no place simply because the 
individual human mind was not fully ‘objective’, nor were the judgments and propensities of 
communities of individuals. There were individuals steeped in superstitions; there were tribes 
engaged in ritualistic dances and mystical magical practices; there were communities engaged in 
blind and cut-throat politics; and there were nations at war. Then, there were music, poetry, 
literature, and the arts oriented toward the innards of the human mind. And, among all this blind 
passion and subjective explorations, here was Science, the only endeavour truly seeking to reach 
out to Nature by transcending human subjectivity.
Paralleling all this lofty status granted to science, there were trends in the philosophy of science 
as well, trends that stressed, on the one hand, the great role of logic in science that made it free of
the vagaries of human psychology and, on the other, the epic of Science unravelling the 
mysteries of nature, of science engaging with reality. To be sure, there were conflicts between 
dictates of logic and claims of science discovering the real workings of nature because logic, 
after all, works in the world of concepts and cannot, by itself, bridge the great divide between 
that world and the real world, the World of nature. But then, it was hoped, science could make 
our conception of nature converge more and more to nature itself.
LOGIC  AND  REALITY
Philosophy of science in the first three quarters of the twentieth century was dominated by 
Logical Positivism and Scientific Realism. The logical approach applied the proverbial Occam’s 
Razor, with logic ideally playing the role of that razor and, to be consistent in its dissections with
the razor, could not, in principle, accede without reservations to the reality of what goes by the 
name of reality, especially that part of it which is remote from our senses. Instead, science was 
seen as attempting to identify regularities of what is sensed and experienced. Scientific realism, 
in its turn, in acknowledging a mind-independent world, had to grapple with the question of how 
the mind can arrive at truths about that world – that central question of epistemology. In other 
words, Logic and Reality resided in distant worlds, and the two could not be united in a 
consistent manner – consistency being supposed to be what science was all about.
But questions of philosophy are abstruse ones. The general perception of science, in both the 
common man and the working scientist was that science was utterly logical and that it revealed 
for mankind the real mechanisms underlying the workings of nature. The two together made up 
the picture of objectivity of science. 
In philosophy as in popular perception, science was seen as something rational because (a) it was logical
and thus free of the common fallibilities of the human mind, (b) it was aimed at the truth about nature,
and (c) it tended to approach that truth more and more closely.
Logical  positivism  was  viewed  variously  even  by  the  proponents  of  the  philosophical  movement
themselves. It was based on the analytic-synthetic distinction originally introduced by Immanuel Kant,
where propositions in logic and mathematics were of the analytic type, while statements with an empirical
content were of the synthetic type, which called for a principle of  verifiability  of such statements. The
question of verifiability brings up the issue of confirmation of scientific hypotheses and theories, but no
logically  compelling  method of  confirmation  could  be  found.  During  the  later  half  of  the  twentieth
century, logical positivism gave way to logical  empiricism in which the failings of the logical positivist
project gradually gained acceptance. At the same time, the overall philosophical framework was sought to
be retained, though without any strong unifying thread. Logical empiricism was thus, in a sense, the self-
examination of logical positivism. It was this self-examination that made room for the development of the
pragmatist and naturalist trends in the philosophy of science, within a broadly realist framework.
An account of the logical positivist and logical empiricist movements in the philosophy of science can be
found in [GodfreySmith].
Logical positivism was no longer the dominant current in the philosophy of science by the fourth
quarter of the twentieth century, while it was precisely this period when naive realism as a trend 
was put to question as well. In a sense, the trouble with both approaches relates to that great gulf 
separating the conceptual world of men from the real world out there, where the two worlds 
could never be bridged seamlessly. Logical positivism harboured within it the sceptical 
viewpoint that questioned everything outside the realm of sense data and could not come up with
a solution to the question as to how the truth of scientific theories be established by logic, for 
which it tried to develop a foolproof theory of induction. If a logic of induction could be 
developed, then that would justify the confirmation of theories by means of empirical 
observations. But no such logically sound foundation of induction was forthcoming, and the state
of affairs remained pretty much the same as where David Hume had left off, with induction 
continuing to remain as the ‘scandal of philosophy’ [Broad].
Realism, on the other hand, grappled vainly with the question of the truth of scientific theories, 
which it could not resolve in a logically sound way. As in the case of logical positivism, realism 
got trapped within the cage of consistency – how could the truth of scientific theories, being 
objects in the conceptual world, be ever proved to be true of the natural world since the two 
worlds are fundamentally remote from each other? The last three decades of the twentieth 
century saw a gradual withering of the lofty status of realism in the philosophy of science.
MICHAEL  POLANYI:  ROOTS  OF  PERSONAL  KNOWLEDGE
The first major current against the impersonal objectivity of science had been initiated by 
Michael Polanyi, a scientist of great repute who turned to the field of philosophy and put forth 
ideas of astounding originality, only to be set aside by the philosophical community with what 
amounted effectively to a condescending dismissal meted out to the amateur. 
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a physical chemist of great stature, and turned to philosophy in his later
years. The relevance of his contributions to the philosophy of science will, perhaps, take many more years
to be fully realized and appreciated. A biography of Polanyi, including his scientific contributions and his
economic, political, and philosophical thoughts, written by his long-standing friend Eugene P. Wigner,
who was also a collaborator, is to be found in [Wigner2] (Wigner’s account of the scientific contributions
of Polanyi is to be complemented by the mention of his path-breaking work on crystal dislocations that
opened  up  the  enormously  important  field  of  plastic  deformations).  Wigner  and Polanyi  had  a  long
correspondence and dialog on questions relating to tacit knowledge, quantum physics, and the mind-body
problem, for which, see [Jha].
Polanyi’s major work of great relevance in the philosophy of science was put together from a 
collection of lectures and essays, and was named Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy [Polanyi1], a major concern of which related to the acquisition of knowledge as the 
act of individuals and, in particular, to the building of scientific concepts and theories as a 
personal endeavour, where the major thrust of Polanyi’s was against the all-consuming critical 
stance of the logical positivist who was sceptical of whatever did not conform to the canons of 
logic. He was one of the early philosophers of science to grasp the significance and relevance of 
cognitive processes taking place below our level of awareness (“we can know more than we can 
tell” [Polanyi2]), or what can be termed pre-conscious and pre-logical stages of cognition. He 
analyzed the process of formation of conjectures, hypotheses, and scientific theories as these 
actually arise in the minds of people, in which he can be identified as perhaps the first major 
naturalist in the modern era. Polanyi, after Freud, was one who delved into the human 
unconscious as the substratum of conscious activity, though, to be sure, his thrust differed from 
Freud’s in that his major concern was to look for the roots of human cognition, where the latter 
has a noticeable conscious component as well.
In looking at what he termed tacit knowledge (or what I feel should more appropriately be 
termed tacit cognition) Polanyi underlined the role of beliefs entrenched in the human mind 
where these beliefs endow the cognitive endeavour of the individual with deeply personal 
explorations and commitments leading to the birth of new concepts, hypotheses, and theories. 
But this concern of Polanyi’s with unconscious personal cognitive processes did not make him 
an anti-realist in the sense of identifying scientific theories as solely mind-dependent constructs 
having no connection with reality. In fact, Polanyi was a realist even as he underlined the deeply 
personal aspects of theory building in science. His view of the process of emergence of scientific
hypotheses was that it was anchored in reality, though not directly so. Instead, the ‘external’ 
reality was seen as causing the generation of a huge store of unconscious bits of clues, the 
constituents of tacit knowledge. This vast and ever-growing store of tacit clues was seen as 
providing the real context in which concepts and theories were produced.
“To say that the discovery of objective truth in science consists in the apprehension of a rationality which 
commands our respect and arouses our contemplative admiration; that such discovery, while using the 
experience of our senses as clues, transcends this experience by embracing the vision of a reality beyond 
the impressions of our senses, a vision which speaks for itself in guiding us to an ever deeper under-
standing of reality—such an account of scientific procedure would be generally shrugged aside as out-
dated Platonism: a piece of mystery-mongering unworthy of an enlightened age. Yet it is precisely on this
conception of objectivity that I wish to insist ....... ” ([Polanyi1], chapter 1).
Thus, it was essentially the supreme naturalist in Polanyi that enabled him to mount a major two-
pronged development in the philosophy of science, a development that, on the one hand, was 
directed against the scepticism of the logical positivist denying everything outside the realm of 
logic, thereby bringing the personal aspects of scientific theory-building to the fore, and on the 
other, sought to establish a causal link between the reality of nature and the subjective world of 
the individual in the form of clues in an unconsciously held storehouse of knowledge. It is 
essentially a link of the same nature as that involved in the perception of forms and shapes of 
objects in our everyday observations, such as the recognition of a face or as the identification of a
white, oval object as an egg. Our mental recognition of either the face or the egg is actually a 
construction in our mind produced by sensory inputs working in the context of stored clues. In 
arriving at such a recognition our mind correctly latches on to some aspects of reality (as van 
Fraassen would say), much like a key fitting a lock – it would, metaphorically speaking, not fit to
just any lock, but only to the one whose inner structure fits its own (the key’s) construction – a 
construction that was dictated by clues supplied by the lock itself (the key was constructed by an 
independent hand from these clues, but it would succeed in opening the lock nevertheless).
In stressing the aspect of hypotheses and theories being constructed in the minds of individuals, 
Polanyi highlighted that these are, truly speaking, guesses –  guesses that were not determined 
uniquely by known data, being generated in flights of imagination, and ones that left open the 
possibility of alternative hypotheses. At the same time, the hypotheses are not pure fancies of the
mind since these are constrained from two sides – on the one hand, the concepts, hypotheses, 
and theories are constrained by the sense data, the inputs generated by our experience in the real 
world, and on the other, these are constrained by the context of our already acquired cognitive 
products, the vast storehouse of knowledge, memories, and clues – partly conscious and 
overwhelmingly tacit. The treasury of tacit knowledge and cognitive clues, in turn, is a product 
of past acquisitions from experience where clues were received of the workings of the world out 
there, and it is thus within a complex and stratified web of existing concepts, clues, hypotheses, 
and theories – all invisibly linked to reality – that new hypotheses and theories are generated. 
This is the two-fold nature of newly generated hypotheses and theories – being products of 
imaginative guesswork constrained by present and past experiences of nature, where clues 
received from nature are made use of. Imagination and reality – these are the two contrary things 
that encapsulate the essential tension inherent in the entire endeavour of science, the tension 
resulting from the fathomless gap between the world of nature and our conceptual world.
“We see here [in scientific discovery, akin to guessing the presence of a burglar in the house at night] a
consistent effort at guessing – and guessing right. The process starts with the very moment when, certain
impressions being felt  to  be  unusual  and suggestive,  a  ‘problem’ is  presenting itself  to  the  mind;  it
continues  with the  collection  of  clues  with  an  eye  to  a  definite  line  of  solving the  problem; and  it
culminates in the guess of a definite solution.”, ([Polanyi3], p 9-10). 
But that gap between our mental world and the real world is not something that we need to read 
too much into because, simply speaking, it is something that we, as limited cognitive agents, 
perceive as a divide between ourselves and Nature – everything that excludes ourselves. It is only
in philosophy that all this smoke is produced where one tries to ‘understand’ this fundamental 
divide, because all forms of life including human beings happily continue and thrive without 
being burdened with  this awe-inspiring ‘responsibility’ of ‘bridging’ the gap. In the course of 
existence, an individual living being engages in various life processes on the basis of myriads of 
clues received from the external reality as also of clues generated internally. The mental activity 
of man is one instance of this ongoing life process – one of a very special nature though. It is 
only when the mind focuses on its own activity vis-a-vis the external world that the conundrum 
of an irreducible gap between the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’ is raised. At the same time, it is this 
gap – the distinction between the real world and our conceptual world – that irrevocably 
constrains the way we perceive the mind-independent reality that we are immersed in.
And Polanyi – the naturalist that he was – did not take it upon himself to resolve the conundrum, 
instead choosing to address the question as to how scientific thought is actually generated in the 
minds of men. In this, Polanyi analyzed in great details a number of aspects of the process of 
formation of new concepts, hypotheses, and theories, much in the manner of an introspective 
study and analysis, and came out with interesting and important clues to this process. The first 
‘clue’, of course, was that the process occurred, in the main, within the matrix of tacit knowledge
and was essentially in the nature of a guess-work, though one that made use of clues acquired 
from the reality that the hypothesis or the theory sought to describe and explain. And the clues 
were immersed within the belief system of the scientist, imparting the process with features of a 
deeply personal nature. A second interesting observation of Polanyi’s was that the process was 
initiated and sustained by a commitment on the part of the scientist, triggered by a puzzle, a 
problem, or an anomaly that the existing theoretical framework failed to solve or explain. 
A third observation was that the clues were half-baked ideas or hints that were tacitly available to
the scientist, having been produced in a long process of experience and prior attempts – failed as 
well as successful ones – to  solve problems of a similar kind. Polanyi highlighted the idea of 
heuristics – hunches and rules of thumb – enunciated by George Polya in the context of problem 
solving in mathematics and thereby anticipated, along with Polya, a broad and major trend to 
take shape in subsequent decades in artificial intelligence and, more generally, in the field of 
understanding and explaining inductive inference in the context of human inferential processes. 
Yet another feature to emerge in the course of Polanyi’s analysis of the process of the formation 
of hypotheses and theories was that it was not a process aimed at grasping the whole of nature, of
nature in its entirety, but one focusing on some aspect of nature, one that relates to the immediate
problem or anomaly at hand (“...an aspect of nature seeking realization in our minds”, 
[Polanyi3], p 21 ) while, at the same time, picking up and pointing at clues to hidden aspects. A 
hypothesis or a theory proves itself superior to an earlier one and supersedes the latter in this 
ability of providing a glimpse to hitherto unrecognized aspects of nature, thereby finding its 
place in an unending succession of hypotheses reaching out to an inexhaustible landscape of 
nature, awaiting exploration. In this optimistic outlook on theories reaching out to nature with its 
infinite hidden dimensions, Polanyi once again proved himself to be an early exponent of the 
naturalist trend in the philosophy of science in the recent era, refusing to address lofty 
philosophical questions relating to the ‘mind attempting to comprehend nature’ – questions that 
were formal and contemplative ones that required endless reflection, with little possibility of an 
acceptable solution. And the naturalist in him gave a new and fresh view of realism too in 
speaking of the infinitude of nature that remains ever unexplored.
“A true physical theory is, therefore, no mere functional relation between observed facts, but represents
an aspect of reality, which may yet manifest inexhaustibly in the future.”, ([Polanyi4],p 191).
Finally, Polanyi came out with the remarkable observation that a creative act of hypothesis 
formation on the part of the individual scientist involved a critical stage in which apparently 
uncorrelated bits of half-formed concepts undergo a spontaneous coalescence into a new 
coherent form, where the coherence is once again to be interpreted with reference to the 
previously existing storehouse of tacitly held cognitive elements and to inputs from the external 
reality.
“We may follow up our parallel between discovery and Gestalt perception by regarding the process of
discovery  as  a  spontaneous  coalescence  of  the  elements  which  must  combine  to  its  achievement.”,
([Polanyi3],  p 19).      
All these aspects of the formation of new concepts and theories in the minds of individuals will 
be discussed at greater length in subsequent sections in this book. I mention these here in order to
indicate how concepts corresponding to aspects of reality can be formed in the minds of men 
where, as Polanyi pointed out, the process is at once constructive and exploratory – one of 
invention and discovery. It is this interweaving of apparently contrary aspects that gives rise to 
philosophical conundrum. I say ‘apparently’ here, because the contrariness is a matter of our 
perception – Nature  does not have any innate design of baffling us with this hugely tough puzzle
of ‘mind versus reality’. We, as thinking agents, are parts of nature and we are ‘forced’ into 
making maps of aspects of nature in our minds where these maps are representative of those 
aspects of reality and, at the same time, are fundamentally skewed ones. The ‘forcing’ is, of 
course, part compulsion and part adventure – adventure into uncharted realms of reality where 
the spirit of adventure is, in all likelihood, acquired in an evolutionary process.
It is the personal and constructive aspects of scientific theories that we will be discussing further 
in the pages of this book, acknowledging at the same time that these aspects are not necessarily 
antithetical to the other aspect of these theories, namely their allegiance to aspects of an external 
reality. In this, scientific theories are, to some extent, comparable to a portrait of an individual 
created by an artist – the individual is sitting out there as the live model whom the artist 
represents in his portrait, but what the artist finally produces is not an exact likeness of the 
external appearance of the model, so much so that the model herself feels anguished at seeing the
finished portrait, complaining that she cannot recognize herself in it. While the artist most 
definitely anchors his work in the presence of the model ‘out there’, yet the portrait turns out to 
be the artist’s perception of her, including ‘dimensions’ of hers perhaps unknown to herself, 
dimensions relating to her personality, her psyche, and her immediate mood. Clues to these other
‘dimensions’ are received by the artist in ways perhaps he himself cannot define, and the 
greatness of the artist lies in how his tacit and unconscious self makes use of these clues, and 
combines these with previously stored perceptions in his mind so as to make a coherent whole 
that, while being a great work of art, is still a skewed representation of the subject sitting 
expectantly in front of him.
THOMAS   KUHN:  THE   PARADIGM   SHIFT
The remarkable insights of Michael Polanyi, however, remained largely unnoticed in the world 
of philosophy of science. While constituting a telling criticism of the received image of science 
(and of human thought in general) these did not raise much of a tremor in that world. But Polanyi
was followed by Thomas Kuhn who did cause a great tremor that extended from the terrain of 
philosophy of science out towards remote cultural terrains, to merge into broader cultural 
movements of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Kuhn’s thoughts had quite a significant 
kinship with Polanyi’s in that both had a naturalist trend and both focused on the constructive 
aspect of scientific theories, at the risk of appearing to undermine the received view of the 
objectivity of science. 
 
Kuhn’s naturalism was expressed in his paramount interest in the history and sociology of 
science, where he refused to engage with abstract philosophical problems, instead looking at how
scientific theories were actually constructed in the historical unfolding of ideas in the context of 
specific challenges of a social and epistemological nature, and at how scientific concepts and 
theories are actually handled by communities of scientists in the course of their professional 
work. He, like Polanyi, was one of the early representatives of the naturalist trend of recent 
decades without overtly contending or appearing to be so, both primarily engaged in settling a 
number of issues in the philosophy of science (issues as perceived by them) without burdening 
themselves with abstract questions of epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics. 
However,  one  cannot  glibly  dismiss  centuries  of  seemingly  abstract  philosophical  discourse  since
philosophical abstraction is by nature akin to scientific abstraction. Questions abstracted away from the
endless  contrariness  of  real  life  lead  to  fruitful  analysis  but  only  if the  results  of  that  analysis  are
continually referred back to the muddied grounds of reality. In a sense, the analytical philosophy of the
first half of the twentieth century was the necessary precursor to the naturalist-cognitive turn that came
about at around the nineteen sixties and seventies. The great merit of the analytical philosophy was that it
never desisted from acute self-analysis.
In his first acclaimed work, The Copernican Revolution [Kuhn2], Kuhn presented a study of how
a major transformation in the world view of science was brought about under the influence of 
factors only partly of an epistemic nature, where major social-cultural components exert an 
equally important influence in the complex of pulls and pushes resulting in the transformation. In
particular, he identified stages in the process where conceptual changes occurred without regard 
to evidential support, or, in other words, without overt concern for convergence with observation
data (Polanyi also drew heavily from an appraisal of the Copernican revolution with his 
inimitable philosophical insight ([Polanyi1],  [Polanyi4])). And then he came out with his major 
and celebrated work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Kuhn1] , where he cogently set 
forth a number of theses relating to the scientific process that put a question mark to the logical-
analytic-philosophical view of an impersonal and objective science undertaking the promethean 
task of bridging the chasm that separates mind from matter and cumulatively unravelling hidden 
mysteries of nature.
Kuhn’s name has now become synonymous with phrases like ‘scientific revolution’, ‘paradigm’, 
‘normal science’ and ‘incommensurability’. However, while his work generated a great stir in 
professional circles of philosophers of science, scientists, and sociologists, and gradually came to
create a remarkable impression in the minds of people much beyond the limits of the 
professional circles – quite in contrast to Polanyi’s work – his bold ideas were not received by 
